Any stage-game with in nite choice sets can be approximated by nite games obtained as increasingly ner discretizations of the in nite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the nite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible in the limit game, then it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game and (ii) if the limit distribution prescribes su ciently di used behavior for rst-stage players, then it is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game. These results are potentially useful in determining the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in applications. As an illustration of this potential, it is shown that the addition of cheap talk to the games considered \restores" the existence of subgame perfect equilibria.
Introduction
This essay considers games with two stages in each stage nitely many p l a yers simultaneously and independently select their actions after observing choices made in previous stages. Players have a continuum of choices, and payo s depend continuously on all players' choices. For convenience' sake, we refer to such games as in nite games. These and similar games have been extensively used to model various economic phenomena such as competition among rms that set capacity and then compete in prices, and location and product di erentiation in oligopolies.
We investigate the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in the games described, the relationship between the equilibria of the in nite game and those of its nite versions, and the consequences of adding communication to these games. There is considerable interest in the existence of equilibria in games with in nite choice-sets. The reasons for this interest are well known and will not be revisited here. 1 Despite their numerous applications, games where choice-sets have the cardinality of the continuum, including the games in this essay, may have no subgame perfect equilibrium. Indeed, Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) construct a w ell-behaved, two-stage game with no subgame perfect equilibrium. 2 For the reader unfamiliar with the subject, a brief discussion of the example is provided toward the end of the introduction.
Our results are best described within the following framework, used throughout the introduction. Fix an in nite game and consider a sequence of nite games constructed by taking increasingly ner discretizations of the in nite game. Each nite game has a subgame perfect outcome, the outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Outcomes are distributions and converge in a subsequence to a limit probability distribution.
The essay's main result, Theorem 1, identi es conditions on the limit distribution that ensure the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium: if the limit distribution prescribes non-atomic behavior for rst-stage players, then the in nite game has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 1 can be used to obtain an equilibrium in applications if the applications have su cient structure to generate di used behavior in the limit. To illustrate this point, consider for instance extensions of the game that incorporate cheap talk|the ability of rst-stage players to send payo -irrelevant messages to second-stage players. Equilibrium outcomes of approximating games can be made into equilibrium outcomes of the cheap-talk extension of those games by letting players send completely uninformative messages|say all cheap-talk messages are sent with equal probability. With a su ciently rich c heap-talk space, the limit outcome will prescribe non-atomic behavior for rst-stage players. Hence, in nite games with su ciently rich c heap talk have a subgame perfect equilibrium. 3 Theorem 1 is obtained from two propositions of independent i n terest. For ease of exposition, we relegate the discussion of the rst proposition to Section 3 and introduce instead a corollary: the limit distribution is a subgame perfect outcome if and only if it is feasible, i.e., if there are some strategies, not necessarily equilibrium strategies, of the in nite game that generate it (Corollary 2). The non-existence example shows that the limit distribution may be infeasible: it may require that second-stage players correlate their actions, and since players must move independently, no strategies can generate that correlation. (The discussion of the non-existence example, below, addresses this point.)
The limit distribution is infeasible whenever it requires second-stage correlation, i.e., a \mixture" of second-stage Nash equilibria. Our second proposition is, to some extent, a \puri cation" of this mixture: when according to the limit distribution rst-stage players choose non-atomic strategies, even if the limit distribution is infeasible, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the limit game. The identi ed equilibrium may generate an outcome di erent from the limit distribution this is obvious when the limit distribution is infeasible. Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) study much more general games than those considered in this essay and prove s e v eral important results, among them, the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any stage-game in which players observe a public, randomization device in each stage. In light of Corollary 2, the role of correlation devices is clear with them, the limit distribution is always feasible, and therefore, it is a subgame perfect outcome. While a public randomization device alters the game to make the limit distribution feasible, Proposition 2 nds a subgame perfect outcome without altering the game. That is, it identi es strategies that do not require correlation and that will generate subgame perfect equilibrium payo s for all players. Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) also prove an important and general upper hemicontinuity result from which they derive their existence theorem. The subgame perfect outcomes of games with correlation devices are distributions on spaces that include payoirrelevant v ariables, the realization of the randomization devices. Harris, Reny, and Robson prove the upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence that maps games with public random-ization devices into the projection of subgame perfect outcomes on payo -relevant v ariables. 4 Their proof is essentially di erent from that suggested by Corollary 2. It uses an argument reminiscent of backward induction. We will return to this in Section 3 after the formal presentation of our results.
The proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 shows that certain equilibrium properties of the approximating outcomes are inherited by the limit distribution. Equilibrium strategies are then constructed, when possible (i.e. when the limit distribution is feasible), from the marginal and conditional probabilities implicit in the limit distribution. This procedure identi es subgame perfect equilibrium strategies on the equilibrium path. The procedure is completed by constructing strategies o the equilibrium path. Using related arguments, we have shown elsewhere that a result analogous to Corollary 2 holds in signaling games with a c o n tinuum of types and actions. We believe t h a t a similar result|that limit distributions when feasible are sequentially rational outcomes of the limit game|may hold for more general games including some games with incomplete information. Proposition 1 may help elucidate that relationship.
Proposition 2 is, technically, a bang-bang result it permits the \puri cation" of the mixing implicit in the limit distribution.
Without describing it formally, we brie y mention some key elements of Harris, Reny, and Robson's example. There are two players in each stage. Only one player, say player 1 in the rst stage, has a c o n tinuum of choices. If player 1's choices are discretized, the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Suppose that in the in nite game player 1's choice set is the interval ;1 1]. Imagine nite games indexed by the integer n where player 1's choice set is replaced by the nite set f;1 : : : ;2=n ;1=n 0 1=n 2= n : : : 1g but where payo functions and other players' choice sets remain unchanged. The example is constructed so that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the n th game player 1 randomizes between ;1=n and 1=n with equal probability. Second-stage players respond by c hoosing \Up" when they observe 1 =n and \Down" when they observe ;1=n. Thus, second-stage players use the randomization in the rst stage to coordinate their actions between two Nash equilibria of the second-stage game, (Up,Up) and (Down, Down).
As n increases, the n th game and the in nite game become closer. The subgame-perfectequilibrium outcomes of the nite games specify, in the limit, that playe r 1 c hoose zero with certainty and that second stage players continue to coordinate their actions, playing (Up,Up) and (Down,Down) with equal probability. This, however, is impossible. Second-stage players choose their actions independently and player 1's choice, always zero, does not help correlate second-stage actions. Were each player independently to select Up and Down with equal probability, the outcome of the second stage would include (Up,Down) and (Down, Up).
Payo s in the example are speci ed so that no subgame perfect equilibrium exists: in order to induce second-stage correlation|which player 1 prefers to no correlation|player 1 is willing to mix between some positive and some negative action. Using non-zero actions, however, is costly to player 1 and such cost increases as the selected actions move a way from zero. Player 1 would therefore prefer to randomize between two actions, a positive and a negative one, as close to zero as possible. Since player 1's choice set is an interval, there is no strictly positive o r strictly negative action closest to zero. There is no \least expensive" way to ensure second-stage correlation.
De nitions and Notation
We consider the following game. In the rst stage, each player i in a nite set I selects in isolation an action a i from a set A i . After observing the actions selected in the rst stage, each player j in a nite set J selects also in isolation an action b j from a set B j . 5 Action spaces are compact metric spaces. All payo functions fU`g`2 I J are continuous, real valued, and have as arguments the actions selected by all players. The game described is summarized by ; = I J fA i g i2I fB j g j2J fU`g`2 I J ]. Given any metric space X, M(X) denotes the set of probability distribution on X. Probability measures are de ned on the corresponding Borel -elds. Unless otherwise speci ed, all sets and functions mentioned are measurable.
For any rst-stage player i 2 I a t ypical (mixed) strategy is a distribution over i's available actions, i 2 M(A i ). For any second-stage player j 2 J a typical (behavior) strategy is a measurable function that assigns to each rst-stage realization a 2 A a distribution over j's actions, j : A ;! M(B j ).
Let be the collection ( 1 2 : : : I ) of rst-stage strategies and the collection ( 1 2 : : : J ) of second-stage strategies. Then, (a) = ( 1 (a) 2 (a) : : : J (a)) indicates the choices made by second-stage players after observing the realization a. Sometimes, specially when integrating, we will write j (db j ja) and (dbja) = ( 1 (db 1 ja) 2 (db 2 ja) : : : J (db j ja) 
Condition (1) states that every rst-stage player selects a best response. Condition (2) requires that for any realization a in the rst stage, (a) be a Nash equilibrium of the ensuing second-stage game. For any a 2 A, let NE(a) bethe set of Nash equilibria of the second-stage game de ned after a is realized. Thus, (a) 2 NE(a) if and only if (2) holds for (a). The outcomes of approximating nite games will be used to establish equilibrium properties of limit in nite games. Typically, g i v en a strategy pro le the outcome of a game is de ned as the distribution on terminal nodes (i.e., an element of M(A B)) generated by the given pro le. It is useful to represent the outcome as a distribution on a slightly di erent space: for any history a 2 A (i.e., any realization of the rst stage game), the strategies determine a continuation path, i.e., an element of Q is used to indicate products of measures as well as Cartesian products. Abusing notation we will sometimes write (a) = ( 1(a) 2(a) : : : J(a)) for Q j2J j(a) and vice versa.
Results
Theorem 1 relates the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of nite games to those of the in nite game that they approximate.
Fix a game ; = I J fA i g i2I fB j g j2J fU`g`2 I J ] for the remainder of the paper. Finite games, i.e., games with nite action spaces, that approximate ; can beconstructed by discretizing ;. We s a y that a a sequence of nite games ; n = I J fA n i g i2I fB n j g j2J fU`g`2 I J ], n = 1 2 : : : converges to the limit game ; if for all players i 2 I, j 2 J, (i) A n i A i and B n j B j 8n, and (iii) lim inf n!1 A n i = A i and lim inf n!1 B n j = B j .
The last condition requires that feasible actions in the limit game be approximated by feasible actions of the approximating games. Thus, nite approximating games are simply increasingly ner discretizations of the in nite game. Since nite games always have a subgame perfect equilibrium, any sequence ; n of nite approximating games yields a sequence of equilibrium outcomes n . These outcomes are distributions (on a compact space) and therefore converge in a subsequence to a limit distribution . Theorem 1 states that if the limit distribution stipulates su ciently di used behavior for rst-stage players, ; will have a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Let ; n n = 1 2 : : : be a sequence of nite games converging to a limit game ;, and let n be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of ; n . Through a subsequence, n converges to a limit distribution . If for two rst stage agents, i 0 i 00 2 I, the marginal distributions A i 0 and A i 00 are non-atomic, then ; has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
According to the limit distribution , any rst-stage player i must choose the strategy A i . If at least two p l a yers exhibit su ciently di used behavior, then ; has a subgame perfect equilibrium. We emphasize, however, that itself need not be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. The proof of Theorem 1, provided below through two propositions of independent interest, clari es the relationship between the limit distribution and the subgame perfect equilibrium identi ed by the theorem.
Although not entirely satisfactory, T h e o r e m 1 m a y be useful to establish the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in some applications. For instance, suppose the limit game ; is enhanced by incorporating cheap talk, i.e., rst-stage players have the additional possibility of sending payo irrelevant messages to second-stage players. Suppose also that cheap-talk messages come from a rich space such as the unit interval. Equilibrium outcomes of nite approximating games without cheap talk can bemade into equilibrium outcomes of games with cheap talk: players use completely uninformative messages such as randomization with equal probability o ver all their cheap-talk possibilities. Then, the limit distribution obtained from the described nite outcomes prescribes non-atomic behavior for rst-stage players who randomize over all their cheap-talk messages. This argument leads to the following corollary, rst established in the discussion following Theorem 45, in Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) .
Corollary 1 Let ; n n = 1 2 : : : be a sequence of nite games converging to a limit game ;, and let n be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of ; n . Through a subsequence, n converges to a limit distribution . Extend ; so that rst-stage players can send to second-stage players payo -irrelevant messages from the unit interval or any other compact metric space with a continuum of elements. Then the extended game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended game that generates the distribution over the payo -relevant variables.
The argument sketched before the corollary does not show that the distribution over payo -relevant v ariables can be generated by a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is obtained from the next results.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows from two propositions. Proposition 1 identi es certain equilibrium properties that the limit distribution inherits from the approximating outcomes, and states that provided there are strategies in ; that satisfy these properties (Proposition 1 (i) and (ii)), a subgame perfect equilibrium will exist. Proposition 2, the main technical contribution in the essay, establishes that whenever the limit distribution exhibits di used behavior there are strategies in ; that satisfy the properties mentioned above.
Proposition 1 Let ; n n = 1 2 : : : be a s e quence of nite games converging to a limit game ;, and let n be a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of ; n . Through a subsequence, n converges to a limit distribution . Let ( ja) be a version of the regular conditional distribution of 2 Proof: Provided in the Appendix.
The limit distribution implicitly speci es certain behavior for players in the limit game: rst-stage players must move according to their corresponding marginal distribution A i second-stage players must move according to the conditional distribution ( ja). Thus, E U i ja i A ;i ] represents player i's expected payo of choosing the action a i when all other players move according to . Condition (i) states that there are strategies that give rststage players the same payo s they would obtain under . Condition (ii) simply states that second-stage players choose best responses almost always.
It follows as a corollary to Proposition 1 that the limit distribution is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game if and only if it is feasible.
Corollary 2 The limit distribution is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game ; if and only if there are strategies in ; that generate . Corollary 2 implies, albeit for a much smaller class of games, Harris, Reny, and Robson's existence result for games with public, randomization devices: it su ces to note that the addition of such devices makes the limit distribution feasible.
The converse, however, is not immediate. To see this, consider a sequence of nite games that converge to ;, and the corresponding subgame perfect outcomes n that converge to a feasible limit distribution . Extend ; with a randomization device whose realizations z come from some set Z. The upper hemi-continuity result in Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) identi es a subgame perfect equilibrium such that (a) each rst-stage player i moves according to A i (b) every second-stage player j uses a strategy (a z) and (c) the outcome of the pro le ( A ) is a distribution over A Z Q j2J M(B j ) whose marginal distribution over the payo -relevant v ariables A Q j2J M(B j ) i s . Subgame perfection implies that (a z) is a second-stage Nash equilibrium for any ( a z). To obtain Corollary 2, one must nd secondstage strategies 0 (a) that depend only on rst-stage realizations, that generate , and that constitute a second-stage Nash equilibrium, i.e., 0 (a) 2 NE(a) for all a. Any s u c h strategies 0 must coincide (almost everywhere) with the strategies obtained by integrating (a z) over z (by (c) above). It does not follow directly from Harris, Reny, and Robson's result that the strategies 0 (a), obtained by i n tegrating out z, are a second-stage Nash equilibrium.
According to Corollary 2, if is feasible, randomization devices are not necessary to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium.
To prove their upper hemi-continuity result, Harris, Reny, and Robson use an argument reminiscent o f backward induction. Proceeding from the last to the rst stage, a backward step identi es for each history the combinations of actions and continuation-payo s that are optimal in that stage. Proceeding from the rst to the last stage, a forward induction step shows that there are equilibrium strategies, and continuation-payo s that realize them.
Our proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 is quite di erent. It starts with equilibrium outcomes of approximating games and shows that limit distributions inherit certain properties. Equilibrium strategies are the marginal and conditional probabilities derived from the limit distribution. As previously noted, any element in the support of an outcome n speci es a rst-stage realization a n 2 A n and a continuation n 2 Q j2J M(B j ). Any element in the support of the limit distribution can be approximated by elements in the support of n . This property and the continuity of payo s are used to obtain our result. We used similar ideas elsewhere to prove the analogue of Corollary 2 for signaling games with in nite type and action spaces. A similar relationship between equilibrium outcomes of nite approximating games and those of in nite games might hold in more general games, including some games of incomplete information. Our proof of Proposition 1 may be useful in elucidating that relationship.
Even if the limit distribution is not feasible, ; may h a ve a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is our next result. In our application '(a) is the second-stage Nash correspondence NE(a), is the limit distribution, and 0 is a second-stage strategy-pro le. Condition (ii) states that 0 ( ) is an a.e. selection, i.e. a Nash equilibrium of the second stage almost always condition (i) states that for almost any action a i , p l a yer i receives the same expected payo under 0 than under the limit distribution . Combining Propositions 1 and 2 one obtains the proof of Theorem 1. A few comments before the proof of Proposition 2 are in order. The limit distribution can beinfeasible in two main cases. The rst case is illustrated by the example described in the introduction: all through the sequence of approximating games a rst-stage player uses a mixed strategy. Second-stage players focus on rst-stage realizations to correlate their actions. Although the support of the mixed strategy collapses in the limit rendering secondstage coordination impossible, the limit distribution still requires second-stage players to correlate their moves: the conditional distribution of given a derived from prescribes mixing among di erent Nash equilibria of the second stage.
The second case in which t h e limit distribution is infeasible occurs when second-stage strategies oscillate at an increasing rate along the sequence of approximating games. As a result of such oscillation, the limit outcome prescribes correlation among second-stage players. To see this, imagine for instance a game with two players in each stage. In the n th approximating game, player 1's equilibrium strategy is n 1 (a 1 ) = 1=n, 8a 1 = k=n, k 2 f1 : : : n g. (For simplicity, player 2, a dummy player, uses a similar strategy.) Second stage players coordinate their actions on player 1's choices: n 1 (a 1 a 2 ) = n 2 (a 1 a 2 ) = U p if a 1 = k=nfor k even, and n 1 (a 1 a 2 ) = n 2 (a 1 a 2 ) = D o wn if a = k=nfor k odd. Thus secondstage strategies jointly oscillate between Up and Down as the nite games approach the limit game. The limit distribution stipulates that for any given (a 1 a 2 ), the second-stage outcome be(Up,Up) or (Down,Down) with equal probability. Hence, the limit distribution is infeasible. 7 A stage-correlation device \solves" this problem by making the limit distribution feasible. Proposition 2 nds, instead, that the limit distribution can be \puri ed." A limit distribution is infeasible only when its conditional distribution ( ja) randomizes among di erent secondstage Nash equilibria. Proposition 2 establishes the existence of a second-stage strategy pro le 0 that avoids the randomization in ( ja), prescribes equilibrium behavior for second-stage players (i.e., it is a selection of the Nash correspondence), and guarantees rst-stage players the same expected payo s they obtained under . 
This equivalence, however, is not su cient to prove our results: even though 0 yields i's expected payo s under , p l a yer i may h a ve a n i n c e n tive t o c hoose a strategy di erent from A i . Player i will not mix according to A i if i's expected payo E U i ja i ;i 0 ] for di erent actions a i (in the support of A i ) is not the same. To guarantee that player i moves according to A i , 0 must satisfy a stronger requirement such as condition (i). Integrating bothsides of (i) with respect to A i , (3) obtains. The proof of Proposition 2 involves three main parts. The rst one uses ideas in Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1951) . The result is rst proved for the case where the range of the correspondence NE( ) is nite, and then it is extended to the continuum case by a limiting argument.
The second part uses ideas in Lindenstrauss (1966) . It is shown that the set W of candidate solutions, i.e., all second-stage continuations f that yield the desired payo s (E U i ja i A i f ] = E U i ja i A i ], for most a i and all i ), is convex and compact and therefore has an extreme point. Demonstrating that any m e m berofW that prescribes correlation cannot be an extreme point is the last step of the proof.
An illustrative (but not entirely accurate) description of the third part follows. The objective is to nd a non-trivial continuation f 0 6 = 0 that yields expected payo zero (E U i ja i A i f 0 ] = 0 for almost all a i and all i). Armed with such a continuation, it is possible to show that any candidate f 2 W that prescribes correlation cannot be an extreme point: the linearity o f expected payo s implies that both f + f 0 and f ; f 0 belong to W. To see how the existence of such f 0 is established, suppose there are only two rst-stage players. Using non-atomicity, their choice spaces are divided into two sets of equal measure, thus partitioning A 1 A 2 into four sets. As indicated in the graph below, we construct a functionf that takes values 1 and ;1 in alternating sets. Proof: Suppose rst that the set S a2A '(a) (which in our application is the set of Nash equilibria of the second-stage game) is nite, and represent its elements by k , k = 1 2 : : : K .
Given a rst-stage realization a 2 A, e a c h k is played with certain probability k (a). and linearity. The second set in the de nition of W i s a w eak closed, convex, subset of the unit ball. Hence W is weak compact (Banach-Aloglou Theorem), and since it is convex it has an extreme point (Krein-Milman Theorem T f = 0 (6) 0 f k + g k 1 for k = 1 : : : K and
Given (7) and (8), g f belong to the second set in (5) (6) The proof of the lemma is provided in the Appendix only a brief intuition is o ered here. Suppose g is an element of W and g k 0 is not an indicator function. Then there must besome set where g k 0 (a) takes values strictly below one and strictly above zero. Since the di erent coordinate functions must add up to one, there must be another function g k 00 , and a set of positive measure in which both functions are bounded away from zero and one. This reasoning leads to (a) and (c). Uniform continuity of the payo functions yields condition (b).
We proceed with the proof of Proposition 2. Relabeling coordinates if necessary, let g k 0 = g 1 and g k 00 = g 2 (Lemma 1 (c)). Let X be the subspace of (L 1 (A A )) K 
where the rst four equations follow using the de nition of T i , rearranging terms, and using the de nition of U i (a 1 2 ). For C > 0, let f c = Cf. Then, using the de nitions of k k T and k k 1 ( (9) and (4) respectively), the de nition of f c , and the inequality ( 1 1 It is immediate that f satis es (6). For k = 1 2, kf k k 1 < = 2, and for k 3 f k = 0 . Thus f satis es (7). By construction f also satis es (8). Then g f 2 W and therefore g cannot be an extreme point.
This completes the proof when S a2A '(a) is nite.
Using the argument i n D v oretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (Section 4, 1951) , it follows that the theorem holds when S a2A '(a) is compact, which is the case here.
Q.E.D.
We conclude with a few comments on related literature. B orgers (1991) de nes a notion of approximation for a class of games and proves that the map from games to pure subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes is upper hemi-continuous. B orgers' result only applies to outcomes generated by pure strategies. Since nite games may not have pure strategy equilibria, his result is not enough to yield existence. Our proof of Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 uses the outcomes of behavior strategies.
Formally the games considered by Simon and Zame (1990) are not stage games. An interpretation that Simon and Zame favor, however, is that their model is a reduced form of a two-stage game where the second-stage players are not explicitly modeled. Instead, second-stage players are replaced by a payo correspondence specifying feasible rst-stage payo s for any realization in the rst stage. (The payo correspondence is obtained from the second-stage Nash equilibrium correspondence by associating to every Nash equilibrium its corresponding payo s for rst-stage players.) Simon and Zame prove that if the payo correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and convex-valued, then it has a measurable selection for which an equilibrium exists. Our results complement Simon and Zame's. We replace the assumption of a convex payo -correspondence with the non-atomicity of rst-stage behavior. Reny and Robson (1995) provide a alternative proof of the main existence theorem in Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) using Simon and Zame's result. Their proof also uses a backward and forward step. It is shorter than the proof in Harris, Reny, and Robson's paper but focus entirely on equilibrium payo s rather than on equilibrium paths.
As noted, the addition of cheap talk \solves" the non-existence problem in stage games and in signaling games with in nite choice-sets. It would be of interest to identify the class of games in which this property holds. Harris, Stinchcombe, and Zame (1999) report an example of an incomplete-information game in which c heap talk fails to restore existence. 9 There are certain similarities between the games considered in this essay and games of incomplete information. Rosenthal and Radner (1982) and Milgrom and Weber (1985) study games in which players observe s o m e p r i v ate information (from a continuum of alternatives) a n d t h e n s i m ultaneously and independently choose an action. 10 Under certain distributional assumptions on information, they show that there exist equilibria in behavior strategies. If in addition action spaces are nite, they prove that pure strategy equilibria exist (or equivalently, that mixed-strategy equilibria can be \puri ed"). This is not the case, however, when there is a continuum of actions. Khan, Rath, and Sun (1999) have constructed a well-behaved game with intervals as choice sets and with no pure strategy equilibrium.
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Lemma 3 Let ; n , n = 1 2 : : : , b e a s e quence of nite games and NE n be t h e c orresponding sequence o f s e cond-stage Nash equilibrium correspondences. Suppose ; n converges to ;. Then lim sup n!1 graph(NE n ) graph(NE):
As a consequence, NE(a) is non-empty 8a 2 A, and if n is a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of ; n and n ) , t h e n supp ] graph(NE).
Proof of Lemma 3: If (a 1 : : : J ) belongs to lim supgraph(NE n ), then there is (a n n 1 : : : n J ) 2 graph(NE n ) s u c h t h a t ( a n n 1 : : : n J ) c o n verges to (a 1 : : : J ). For any j 2 J, E U j ja n n 1 : : : n J ] E U j ja n b n j n ;j ] 8b n j 2 B n j : (12) For any b j 2 B j , there is b n j 2 B n such that b n j converges to b j . Taking limits in (12), it follows that (a 1 : : : J ) i s i n g r a p h ( NE).
Proof of Theorem 1: Let i = A i for all i 2 I. The proof constructs second-stage strategies and shows that ( ) satis es (1) and (2). The equilibrium strategies j for second-stage players are constructed in sucessive steps by de ning strategies that satisfy (2) and then re ning them to satisfy (1).
Note for later use that there is a subgame perfect equilibrium ( n n ) i n ; n that generates n .
1 . ] Second-stage equilibrium.
By hypothesis (ii), there is a set A 0 A, A (A 0 ) = 1 , such that for any a 2 A 0 , 0 (a) 2 N(a).
Let 00 beany measurable everywhere selection from the Nash Equilibrium correspondence NE( ). Such a selection exists because NE( ) is upper hemi-continuous and compact valued (see for instance, Arsenin-Kunugui Theorem, Kechris (1995) 2 . ] Second-stage equilibrium strategies.
The second-stage strategies j are modi ed in a set of A -measure zero to ensure that (1) holds.
For each i 2 I consider the set of least-preferred, second-stage Nash equilibrium outcomes:
The correspondence ( ) is compact valued|which follows from verifying the de nitions| and has a measurable graph|which follows, for instance, from Proposition 3, D.II.3, page 60, in Hildenbrand (1971) It is now v eri ed that ( ) is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
First, we show that (a) 2 NE(a) 8a 2 A. Note that (a) 2 NE(a), and (a) di ers from (a) only when a 2 S i2I (Ã c i Ã ;i ), in which case (a) is also a second-stage Nash equilibrium. Second, we s h o w that ( ) satis es (1).
Suppose that a i is inÃ i . Under the assumption that i (Ã i ) = 1 8i 2 I, the strategy j di ers from j only on a set of measure zero. Therefore the right side of (1) Hence, by de nition ofÃ i , (1) is satis ed.
Suppose, alternatively, that a i is not inÃ i . Let a n i 2 A n i for all n, and a n i ;! a i .
(Such sequence exists because ; n converges to ;. In ; n , when i chooses a n i and all other players move according to their equilibrium strategies ( n ;i n ), i can expect the following continuation:
n (a n i ) = n ;i f ;1 n where f n (a ;i ) = ( a ;i n (a n i a ;i )):
In a subsequence, (a n i n (a n i )) ;! ( a i ) for some 2 M(A ;i Q j2J M(B j )). Since ( n n )
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of ; n , E U i j n n ] E U i ja n i n ;i n ] = E U i ja n i n (a n i )]:
As n ;! If (a ;i ) belongs to supp ], there is (a n ;i n ) 2 supp n (a n i )] such t h a t ( a n ;i n ) ;! (a ;i ).
Since n belongs to NE n (a n i a n ;i ), then must belong to NE( a i a ;i ) (Lemma 3 
Note that by construction of , f o r a n y a ;i 2 (A 0 \Ã ;i ) a n d 2 NE( a i a ;i ), For later reference we p r o ve t h a t We n o w p r o ve successively that both term in the last expression converge to zero as tends to zero. Given (15), all functions over which the supremum is applied are bounded thus, the expression above converges to zero. Hence, (14) Each g n is a continuous density and, as n ! 1 , g n converges uniformly to g. Since ( n n )
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of ; n , E U i j n n ] E U i j n i g n n ;i n ]:
As n ! 1 , the right side of the inequality c o n verges to E U i j ] (since n generates n and n ) . The left side of the inequality c o n verges to E U i j i g ;i ] (Theorem 5.5, page 34, Billingsley (1968) ). This contradicts (14). Hence,Ã i must have i ]-measure one.
Proof of Lemma 1: Relabeling coordinates if necessary, let k 0 = 1 a n d k 00 = 2 . The proof proceeds in three steps.
1. We p r o ve that there is an > 0 a n d a s e t E with A (Ẽ) > 0 s u c h that < g k (a) < 1; a.e., for k = 1 2.
Suppose g k 0 is not an indicator function. LetẼ k 0 = fa 2 E k 0 : 0 < g k 0 (a) < 1g. For k 6 = k 0 , letẼ k = fa 2Ẽ k 0 : 0 < g k (a) < 1g. Since 2. We prove that there existsD i A i for all i 2 I, such that A ( Q i2ID i ) > 0, and for k = 1 2, 1 < g k (a) < 1 ; 1 a.e. in Q i2ID i .
Let F be the set of measurable rectangles in A such that < g k < 1; a.e. for k = 1 2. The set F is a semiring (i.e, F is closed under nite intersections, contains the empty set, and if B C2 F and B C, then there are disjoint s e t s C 1 C 2 : : : C N such that C n B = S N n=1 C n ).
Let G = fG : G =Ẽ \ E for some E 2 A g . G is a -eld. Clearly, F G and the restriction of A to G is a nite measure. By Dinkin's ; Theorem, (F) = G. By Theorem 11.4 in Billingsley (1978) , page 140, 8 0 > 0, there is a disjoint sequence of sets fB n g 1 n=1 , B n 2 F 8n, such thatẼ S 1 n=1 B n and A ( S 1 n=1 B n nẼ) < 0 . If all elements of F had A {measure zero, thenẼ would have measure zero. Thus, there is some B n with positive measure. Since B n 2 F , the desired result is established.
3. The previous steps prove that there are setsD i satisfying (a) and (c). We will prove Proof of Lemma 2: If T f = 0 has a unique solution, T ;1 : T X ! X is well de ned: 8y 2 T X , there is a unique f 2 X such that T f = y. From the Banach Inverse Theorem, T ;1 is bounded. Then, 9C such that kT ;1 yk Ckyk 8y 2 T X . Since f = T ;1 T f and y = T f , then 8f 2 X, kfk CkT f k.
If 8f 2 X, kfk CkT f k, then if T f = 0 , kfk = 0 which implies, f = 0 .
